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RESUMEN
El estudio metodológico de horizonte largo es usado para documentar el impacto severo de la
crisis de la finca raíz de Estados Unidos en la Economía Colombiana. El parámetro estimado
de la constante del retorno del modelo es usado para derivar el retorno anormal en el mercado
de portafolios sobre su selección de la ventana de evento. Análisis de estos resultados reve-
lan que la crisis de la finca raíz en Estados Unidos afectó negativamente ambos mercados de
acciones en Estados Unidos y Colombia casi idénticamente en términos de reducción de
porcentaje cumulativo y tiempo. Resultados de pruebas estadísticas parecen soportar la ob-
servación. Este fenómeno puede ser atribuido a los recientes acuerdos de comercio
multilaterales y regionales que incrementan el flujo de comercio e inversión extranjera directa
a Colombia.
Palabras clave: Estudio metodológico de horizonte largo; Finca raíz; retorno anormal; modelo
de la constante del retorno, Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos y Colombia
ABSTRACT
The long-horizon event study methodology is used to document the severe impact of the US
subprime mortgage crisis on the Colombian economy. The estimated parameter of a constant-
mean return model is used to derive the “abnormal return” on the market portfolios of Colombia
over its selected event window. Analyses of the results reveal that the US subprime mortgage
crisis negatively affected both the Colombian and the US equity markets almost identically in
terms of cumulative percentage reductions and timing. Statistic testing results seem to support
the qualitative observation. This phenomenon can be attributable to the recent multilateral and
regional trade agreements that increase the flow of trade and foreign direct investment to
Colombia.
Key words: Event study; subprime mortgage; abnormal returns; constant mean returns model,
US- Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.
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INTRODUCTION
With new technological advances that seem to
shrink the world, national economies around the
globe have become more intertwined -like a
cobweb. The neo-classical export-led
development strategy, advocated by the Bretton
Woods Institutions, and the recent birth of the
World Trade Organization have caused the
international trade volume to increase
exponentially. This, along with unprecedented
mobility of capital due to advances in
communication technologies and new
international investment opportunities, has been
an impetus for nations around the world to
develop their economies and to drastically
improve the social welfare of their population.
Paradoxically, increases in international capital
mobility with its fluid nature are often the cause of
financial crises of international dimensions. This
often causes large sudden reductions in the
volume of the international trade flows and disrupts
the economic activities causing monetary crises
in many nations. Moreover, in the current
economic climate, not all economic relationships
between two nations are alike. These bilateral
relationships depend on the degree of
development, endowments of natural resources,
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and infrastructures of the countries involved and
so on. Usually the industrialized economies with
fully developed infrastructures can weather certain
crises or sustain contagions of crises from other
countries better than others, while less developed
countries usually suffer severely from crises.
Efforts to bolster the trade and capital flows
between the US and Colombia include the Andean
Trade Preferences Act/Andean Trade Promotion
and Drug Eradication Act [ATPA/ATPDEA] and the
yet to be enforced US- Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement [CTPA]. Historically, the US and Co-
lombia engaged in negotiations for the latter since
early 2004. The initiative included initially Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. Both Bolivia and
Ecuador eventually stepped aside. On November
22, 2006, Deputy US Trade Representative John
Veroneau signed the Agreement on behalf of the
United States. However, under pressure from
congressional Democrats, the Bush administration
renegotiated the agreement to include more
stringent environmental and labor standards. It was
signed again in 2007. When enforced, This
Preferential Trade Agreement will link the
Colombian economy closer to the US economy
as NAFTA did to the US, Canadian, and Mexican
economies.
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Naturally in the age of internationalization, a
financial crisis of international dimension would be
negatively contagious to other economies to certain
degree. While the expatriate Colombians in the US
may not be an important source of financial capi-
tal inflow to Colombia, the Andean Trade Agreement
has definitely closely linked the US and the
Colombian economies together. Also, the
international trade between Colombia and the US
is of non-ultra. Therefore, when the subprime
mortgage crisis pushed the US economy into its
most severe recession since the great depression
of the 1930’s, the US demand for Colombian
products decreased. The resulting altered trade
flows and reductions in even small repatriated
funds–magnified by the foreign trade multiplier–
would negatively affect the Colombian economy.
The task of isolating and measuring the total impact
of the US subprime crisis on the Colombian
economy may seem to be hopelessly impossible.
Fortunately, long-horizon event study
methodologies have been developed which may
be utilized to analyze the effects of these economic
events. This model measures the impact of an
event on the economy as a whole by first
calculating and then analyzing the “abnormal
returns” on the indices of market portfolios (i.e. the
financial instrument price indices.) The usefulness
of such a study using financial market data is based
on the assumption that markets are rational and
efficient; thus, the effects of any newsworthy event
will be reflected immediately in security prices and
hence in indexes of a market portfolios. Thus a
measure of an event’s economic impact can be
constructed using financial market data observed
over a relatively short time period. In contrast,
measurement by direct productivity may require
many months or even years of observation, before
the effects can be measured, (MacKinlay, 1997,
p. 13).
Event studies using financial market data have a
rich history in economic and financial analysis.
The first published study was Dolley (1933), which
studied nominal price changes at the time of stock
splits. From the early 1930s until the late 1960s,
the level of sophistication of event studies
increased through the work, for example, of Myers
and Bakay (1948), Barker (1956, 1957, 1958), and
Ashley (1962). In the late 1960s, seminal studies
by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, et al. (1969)
introduced variations in the methodology. These
modifications relate to complications arising from
violations of the statistical assumptions used in
the early work and relate to adjustments in the
design to accommodate more specific
hypotheses. The issues relating the practical
importance of many of the complications and
adjustments are addressed in papers by Brown
and Warner published in 1980 and 1985. The 1980
paper considers implementation issues for data
sampled at a monthly interval and the 1985 paper
deals with issues for daily data.
In light of the above discussion, this study uses
the long horizon event study methodology to
assess the impact of the US subprime mortgage
crisis on the Colombian economy. The remainder
of this study is organized as follows: the next
section briefly describes the methodology used
in the investigation; the following section identifies
event dates and describes the data for the study;
the section that follows reports the empirical
results; the next section discusses the empirical
findings; and the final section provides concluding
remarks.
METHODOLOGY
Event study has been so widely accepted
theoretically and in practice that “the Security and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regularly uses
event studies to measure illicit gains captured by
traders who may have violated insider trading or
other securities laws. Event studies are also used
in fraud cases, where the court must assess
damages caused by a fraudulent activity (Bodie,
Kane & Marcus 2009, p. 356.)” Interestingly, after
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rigorous analyses and comparisons of the power
of the constant returns model to other models
using monthly data, Brown and Warner concluded
that “This result is striking: It suggests that the
simple model, the Mean Adjusted Returns
method, is no less likely than either of the other
two to detect abnormal performance when it is
present, (Brown & Warner 1980, p. 216)”. This
study uses the constant mean returns model of
the event study methodologies to investigate the
impact of the US subprime mortgage shock on
the Colombian economy. Returns will be indexed
in event time, τ. Following MacKinlay (1997 pp.
19-20), this study defines τ = 0 as the event date,
τ = T1 + 1 to τ = T2 represents the event window,
and τ = T0 + 1 to τ = T1 constitutes the estimation
window. Let L1 = T1 - T0 and L2 = T2 - T1 -1 be the
lengths of the estimation window and the event
window respectively. Given the above defined
notations, the statistically motivated constant
mean returns model, applied to the index on the
market portfolio of country i, can be expressed
as follows:
Where Rit is the period-t return on the market
portfolio of country i, µi is the constant mean of
returns on the market portfolio of country i, εit is
the period-t disturbance term of the return on the
market portfolio for country i, and εit ~ i.i.d.(0,σ2εi).
With the parameter estimate of equation (1), ,
one can measure and analyze the abnormal
returns. Let ARiτ, τ = T1 + 1,..., T2, be the L2
abnormal returns for country i in the event window.
Using the constant mean returns model to
measure the normal return, the sample abnormal
return in the event window is:
The abnormal return is really the disturbance term
of the constant mean returns model calculated
on an “out-of -sample basis”. Methodologically,
the calculated abnormal returns are accumulated
through time to draw an overall comparison. As
articulated by MacKinlay (1997, p. 21): “The
concept of cumulative abnormal return is
necessary to accommodate a multiple period
event window”. Define CARi (τ1 , τ2) as the
cumulative abnormal returns of the market
portfolio of country i, (CARi) from τ1 to τ2 where
T1 < τ1 << τ2 < T2. The individual country market
portfolio’s abnormal returns can be aggregated
using ARiτ from (2). The CARi from τ1 to τ2 is the
sum of the included abnormal returns.
Naturally, the average abnormal return on the
market portfolio of country i can be calculated
using ARiτ from (2) for the event period, τ = T1 + 1,...,
T2; i.e. L2 periods as follows:
An important question is; as the subprime
mortgage crisis pushed the US stock prices on
an oscillating downward path, how did the
Colombian stock prices behave? The calculated
average abnormal returns for both the US and
the Colombian stock price indices, and their
variances in the event window can be used to
test the hypothesis that the reduction in average
abnormal return on the Colombian market portfolio
is statistically the same as that for the US. The
set of null and alternate hypothesis can be stated
in equation (5). The testable hypothesis for this
question can be set up by the following null
hypothesis, (H0), and the alternative hypothesis,(H
a
). As shown by Anderson, et al. (2006 pp. 399-
389) the above descriptive statistics can be used
to calculate the two tailed t-statistic and its degree
of freedom to test the set of hypotheses (5).
Although testing the set of null and alternative
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absolute answer to the question, it may
scientifically lend credence or repudiate qualitative
observations.
EVENT DATES AND DATA
This study uses monthly Colombian stock price
index and the US S&P 500 index to calculate the
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns on the
market portfolios for these countries. While the
US housing market bubbles had been speculated
as early as 2006, the portending crisis was not
initially taken seriously by either Wall Street or Main
Street. The seriousness of the crisis took some
time to be recognized by both Wall Street and
Main Street. According to the time line of the cri-
sis reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, the first official indication of the US
subprime mortgage crisis was the announcement
on February 27, 2007, by the Federal Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) that it would no longer
buy the most risky subprime mortgages and
mortgage-related securities. Additional recognition
of the crisis followed as leading subprime
mortgage lender—New Century Financial
Corporation— filed for Chapter 11 on April 2, 2007.
The first sign of the international dimension of the
US subprime mortgage crisis was the
authorization on September 14, 2007 by the UK
Chancellor of the Exchequer for the Bank of
England to provide liquidity support for Northern
Rock, the fifth largest mortgage lender in the U.K.
Standard and Poor ’s and Moody’s Investor
Services downgraded over 100 bonds backed by
second-lien subprime mortgages on June 1, 2007.
This action was quickly followed by Bear Stearns’
informing investors that it was suspending
redemptions from its High-Grade Structured Credit
Strategies Enhanced Fund on June 7, 2007. This
action shook US financial markets and precipitated
the beginning of downward spirals of equity markets
in both the US and Colombia. Thus, across this
spectrum of events, it can be arguably posited that
May 2007 was the event month of the subprime
crisis for the US and Colombia.
In most of the long-horizon event studies, the
challenging question is the appropriate beginning
and the length for the event window. After carefully
analyzing the data, considering the aforementioned
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s time-line of
the crisis, this study chooses the event window to
begin in June 2006 and to end on January 2009.
The estimation period is between August 2001 and
May 2006 inclusively. These selections provide 58
monthly observations for the estimation period and
32 monthly observations for the estimation of the
abnormal returns.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The point estimates of the model show that µCL
and µUS, the estimated constant mean of returns
on the market portfolios of the Colombian and the
US, are 4.232974 and 0.160668 respectively. The
abnormal returns for Colombia ARCLτ and for the
US ARUSτ are calculated, using these parameter
estimates and the constant mean returns model
(2). Similarly, the sample cumulative abnormal
returns on the market portfolios of Colombia and
US - CARCL (–11,20) and CARUS (–11,20)
respectively - are calculated using equation (3).
The calculation results are reported in table 1.
Figure 1 displays the behavior of the respective
cumulative abnormal returns on the US market
portfolio CARUS (–11,20), and the Colombian market
portfolio in the above defined event window CARCL(–11,20). The descriptive statistics reveal that the
mean of the abnormal returns on the Colombian
market portfolio, ARCLτ in the event window is -
0.5750, ranging from -22.2911 to 17.2442, with the
sample variance being 47.2040. The descriptive
statistics also show that the corresponding figures
for the US, ARUSτ, is -1.3780 ranging from -17.1031
to 4.9400, with the sample variance of 23.0436.
(5)
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As Figure 1 shows, the cumulative abnormal
returns on both the Colombian and the US market
portfolios increase significantly for twelve months
prior to the selected event month (May 2007) of
the event window with the Colombia’s index
having higher variance, indicating bull financial
markets in both countries. The patterns of the
Colombian and the US monthly abnormal returns
on their market portfolios tracked each other very
closely in the ensuing eighteen months, beginning
at the selected event month. However, the
Colombian equity market oscillated more widely,
as compared to the US’s, around a steep
downward trend, In the last three months of the
event window, while the US abnormal returns
continued to move downward, the Colombian
stock prices took a sharp upward turn.
The natural question is whether there is statistical
support for the qualitative observation that the
abnormal returns on the Colombian and the US
stock price indices tacked each other closely
during the event window. As aforementioned, while
testing the two sets of null and alternative
hypotheses, stated in equation (5) may not be an
absolute answer to the question; it may lend
statistical credence or repudiate qualitative
Figure 1
observations. From the above descriptive statistic,
the calculated two tailed t-statistic for testing the
set of hypotheses (5) is 0.5420 with 25 degrees
of freedom. The critical values for such statistics
are ± 2.060 at the 5 percent level of significance,
indicating that the null hypothesis of the average
abnormal returns on the Colombian stock market
is statistically the same as that one of the US’s
cannot be rejected during the selected event
window. This failure supports the qualitative
observation that the average of the monthly
abnormal returns of the stock prices of the
Colombian and the US stock prices suffered from
the same magnitude of reduction.
Historically, most of the new laws added to the
books were enacted to deal with or to rectify past
situations; rarely were they enacted pro-actively
to resolve the future predictions and unknown
situations. By definition, unknowns are unknown;
thus no authority can, at any point in time, enact
laws or formulate regulations to rectify a currently
unknown situation in the future. However, the
currently unknown and currently permissible
activities that may have seriously unintended
consequences which may not be known at the
time the laws permit such activities do exist; but
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no laws or regulations may be enacted to pre-
empt them. Clearly, the nature of the laws and
regulations coupled with any of the behaviors of
legal economic entities such as irrational
exuberance, animal spirit, herding behavior,
rational speculative bubble, or plain panicking will
definitely create future crises. Even though
macroeconomic policymakers have learned how
to mitigate the magnitude of the up-down swings
of business cycles, they cannot completely
outlaw them, i.e., business cycles will continue
as will crises of international dimension and their
contagions! History has proved this to be true in
the current age of globalization
 Table 1
Colombia Event Window  United States
Date  ARCL CARCL τ ARUS CARUS Date
2006-06 -15.71534 -15.71534 -11 -0.15200 -0.15200 2006-06
2006-07 17.24422 1.52888 -10 0.34792 0.19593 2006-07
2006-08 5.16266 6.69153 -9 1.96677 2.16269 2006-08
2006-09 -3.24158 3.44995 -8 2.29597 4.45866 2006-09
2006-10 10.75411 14.20406 -7 2.99014 7.44881 2006-10
2006-11 -0.73540 13.46866 -6 1.48600 8.93481 2006-11
2006-12 8.43468 21.90335 -5 1.10092 10.03573 2006-12
2007-01 -3.69448 18.20887 -4 1.24525 11.28098 2007-01
2007-02 -6.74879 11.46008 -3 -2.34527 8.93571 2007-02
2007-03 5.24559 16.70566 -2 0.83734 9.77304 2007-03
2007-04 0.71179 17.41745 -1 4.16841 13.94145 2007-04
2007-05 -6.19048 11.22697 0 3.09426 17.03572 2007-05
2007-06 4.02763 15.25460 1 -1.94229 15.09343 2007-06
2007-07 3.99307 19.24767 2 -3.35885 11.73458 2007-07
2007-08 -3.83361 15.41407 3 1.12570 12.86028 2007-08
2007-09 -3.16641 12.24766 4 3.41874 16.27903 2007-09
2007-10 1.45415 13.70180 5 1.32158 17.60060 2007-10
2007-11 4.14384 17.84564 6 -4.56500 13.03560 2007-11
2007-12 -4.21610 13.62954 7 -1.02351 12.01209 2007-12
2008-01 -15.26143 -1.63189 8 -6.27701 5.73509 2008-01
2008-02 0.50507 -1.12682 9 -3.63677 2.09831 2008-02
2008-03 -2.79549 -3.92231 10 -0.75662 1.34170 2008-03
2008-04 10.28968 6.36738 11 4.59401 5.93571 2008-04
2008-05 0.65619 7.02357 12 0.90676 6.84247 2008-05
2008-06 -9.02136 -1.99779 13 -8.75690 -1.91443 2008-06
2008-07 -1.70698 -3.70477 14 -1.14660 -3.06103 2008-07
2008-08 3.03982 -0.66495 15 1.05839 -2.00263 2008-08
2008-09 -1.77316 -2.43812 16 -9.23980 -11.24244 2008-09
2008-10 -22.29105 -24.72916 17 -17.10311 -28.34555 2008-10
2008-11 0.805316 -23.923846 18 -7.64556 -35.99111 2008-11
2008-12 2.937966 -20.985880 19 0.62150 -35.36961 2008-12
2009-01 2.587278 -18.398602 20 -8.72639 -44.09600 2009-01
Taken together, the testing process indicates that
the US subprime mortgage crisis affected the
Colombian equity market the same as it did the US
stock market in percentage measures. Interestingly,
this impact took place at the same time that the
crisis was manifested in the US and before the first
sign of international contagion as evidenced by the
authorization of the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer
for the Bank of England to provide liquidity support
for Northern Rock on September 14, 2007. Now that
their economy is closely linked to the US economy,
the Colombian policymakers should be aware of
the contagious patterns in designing their national
economic policy to incorporated measures to
counter future external shocks originated from
the US.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study uses the event study methodology to
assess the impact of the US subprime mortgage
crisis on the Colombian equity market. The
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empirical results suggest that the Colombian
equity market suffered the same consequences
in term of percentage reduction in the index and
timing as the US market. This qualitative
observation is supported by simple statistical
comparisons the means of the abnormal returns
of the US and the Colombian stock price indices.
The subprime mortgage crisis may reduce the
US demand for Colombian products and to lesser
degree a reduction in the repatriated funds are
plausible explanations for the observed contagion.
As long as the business cycles in the developed
countries are not outlawed, the downturns
originated in these countries will always be the
source of economic difficulty for the international
community, especially, the developing and
transitional economies. Clearly, the more closely
connected the developing economies are to the
industrialized economies, the more opportunities
the developing economies can develop in the
prosperous time. The problems would however
be more severe for them in the downturns. Thus,
Colombian policymakers should be aware of the
contagious patterns in designing their national
economic policy to incorporated measures to
counter future external shocks especially if the
CTPA is enforced and closely ties the Colombian
economy to the US economy.
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